Abstract: In this study, we aimed to test the hypothesis that intergroup conflict would enhance not only ingroup cooperation, but also conformity (frequencydependent tendency). One hundred and eighty undergraduate students participated in a vignette experiment. They read four scenarios describing daily intergroup conflict situations, and rated behavioral intention for ingroup cooperation and frequencydependent tendency of ingroup members. In each vignette, level of intergroup conflict (weak/moderate) was manipulated by costs of defeat. The results supported the hypothesis in part that intergroup conflict enhanced both ingroup cooperation and conformity.
Social psychologists have demonstrated that in an intergroup conflict situation, ingroup cooperation is rational even if it includes several costs (e.g., Bornstein, 2003; Sherif, 1966) . Once common group goals and identity are emphasized, group-based altruistic or patriotic norms are fortified and shared perception of the out-group is manipulated (Campbell, 1965; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Sherif, 1966; Simmel, 1955; Stein, 1976) . On the other hand, the theoretical question of how the free-rider problem is solved still needs to be resolved. The outcome of intergroup conflict (e.g., territory) is public goods that are available to all group members regardless of their contribution to their group's effort. Since contribution entails personal costs (e.g., time, money, physical effort), rational group members have an incentive to rely on the contributions of others. Defectors who prefer individual benefits rather than contributing to the common good are called free-riders. The problem is that if everyone were to engage in free-rides, the group would lose the competition and public goods would not be provided. How can people achieve mutual cooperation in an intergroup conflict situation?
Several solutions to the free-rider problem within intergroup conflict situations have been proposed, such as the monitoring and sanction system (Messick & Brewer, 1983; Yamagishi, 1988) , coalitional psychology (McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 1988; Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007; Yuki & Yokota, 2009) , strong reciprocity (e.g., Gintis, 2000) , and display of solidarity hypothesis (Gould, 1999 (Gould, , 2000 Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009) . In this study, we focused on the multi-level selection theory (Sober & Wilson, 1998 ) and the cultural group-selection theory (Boyd & Richerson, 2005) as the explanation of evolution of cooperation. Based on these theories, it is hypothesized that conformity (e.g., Asch, 1951; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969) would contribute to prevalence of ingroup cooperation and accelerate its enhancement. We demonstrated a vignette experiment to test this hypothesis. Sober and Wilson (1998) proposed that multilevel group selection involves several layers of selection. According to the multi-level selection theory, the level of selection is hierarchical, and natural selection operates at two different levels: selection at the group level relates to conflict between groups, and selection at the individual level relates to individual competition within a group (Price, 1970) . Given that selection pressure at the group level by far outweighs pressure at the individual level, ingroup cooperation becomes a rational choice (Bornstein, 2003; Bowles, 2006; Campbell, 1965; Choi & Bowles, 2007; Sherif, 1966) .
Conformity for Polarization of Cooperation within a Group
Furthermore, conformity could boost enhancement of cooperation, and also cooperation would enhance conformity under the condition in which selection pressure at a group level is being conducted. Boyd and Richerson (2005) argued that a social learning mechanism could solve the free-rider problem. They pointed out that learning to imitate an act of the majority within a group (conformity) might be necessary for cumulative cultural evolution. In this study, based on the cultural group selection theory, we define conformity as a frequency-dependence tendency in which cooperation or defection is decided upon by the cooperation rate within a group. It is further argued that frequency-dependent behavior causes the behavioral variation within a group to converge and the variation among groups to expand. Polarization of behaviors smoothly and rapidly develops so that the majority of members cooperate into a perfectly cooperative group, and a group in which the majority of members defect develops into a perfectly non-cooperative group. For example, if over half of the group members were to cooperate as default, frequency-dependent behavior would function to enhance cooperative individuals within a group. However, if over half of the group members were to defect as default, frequency-dependent behavior would enhance non-cooperative individuals. Then, cooperative individuals in noncooperative groups could not evolve due to incurring the double costs of cooperation and defeat. Since selection pressure favors noncooperative groups compared with cooperative groups, non-cooperative groups become extinct in the end. Individuals with non-frequency-dependence can merely take more advantages than those who adopt frequencydependence. If one unconditional defector belongs to a group in which cooperative and conformable group members dominate, the group cannot overcome perfectly cooperative groups. An unconditional cooperator, as mentioned above, is more vulnerable in a group in which defectors dominate than a cooperator with frequency-dependence. Thus, unconformity cannot contribute to build up a cooperative group. Therefore, in intergroup conflict situations, it is predicted that individuals who demonstrate both ingroup cooperation and frequency-dependent tendency can be adaptive.
This hypothesis was supported by agentbased simulations (Nakanishi & Yokota, 2016; Yokota & Nakanishi, 2012) . The results of the simulations showed that, as the intergroup conflict intensified, ingroup cooperation and frequency-dependent behavior within a group evolved in the situation in which agents could refer to other group members' behavior of a previous trial in a social dilemma game. Thus, the impact of intergroup conflict strengthened the enhancement of ingroup cooperation and frequency-dependent behavior from a weak to a strong level of conflict. However, there is little empirical data to test the hypothesis. It should be investigated whether the behavior predicted by our hypothesis can be replicated on real human beings.
Current Study
The goal of this study was to provide empirical data to test whether intergroup conflict would enhance ingroup cooperation and conformity (frequency-dependent behavior) in a vignette experiment. The method using a vignette makes it possible to describe behaviors under intergroup conflict situations. To test our hypothesis, it is essential to manipulate the intensification of intergroup conflict. The external validity is also examined by using the vignette method. Furthermore, two advantages of a vignette experiment are as follows: First, the situation-how many ingroup members cooperate-can be manipulated. The manipulation-of-cooperation rate within a group makes it possible to measure whether participants behave frequency-dependently. Second, consistency of the effect of intergroup conflict on ingroup cooperation and frequency-dependent behavior can be investigated by assuming several situations of intergroup conflict in daily life. In this study, the hypothesis was tested by asking participants to imagine that they were faced with intergroup conflict situations described in the vignette. Participants were asked to play a role in four imagined everyday intergroup conflict situations, and behavioral tendencies toward ingroup cooperation and frequency-dependent tendency were measured. The intensification of intergroup conflict was manipulated by indicating whether participants would incur a higher or lower conflict cost in the future. Participants read four vignettes to reveal a robust tendency of the effect of intergroup conflict on ingroup cooperation and frequency-dependent tendency. In this situation, two types of frequency-dependent behavior were predicted, positive-frequency-dependence and negativefrequency-dependence. In this study, positivefrequency-dependence is referred to as the strategy to cooperate responsively if the cooperation rate within a group is enhanced (negative-frequency-dependence is vice-versa). According to anti-conformity (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) and Nakanishi and Yokota (2016) , it is rational for individuals to choose defection if the majority of ingroup members cooperate in intergroup conflicts. However, it is predicted that the impact of intergroup conflict increases as the level of conflict gradually intensifies. Consequently, ingroup cooperation and conformity should increase.
Experiment
Participants A total of 180 undergraduate students (49 females, 131 males, M age = 20.33 years, SD age = 0.73) participated in this experiment during a psychology class or after participating in another experiment. 3 No incentive (e.g., money or course credit) was provided for participation. Participants were debriefed via the social psychology lab website after the experiment.
Procedure
Participants were given a booklet 4 that included four vignettes describing everyday intergroup conflict situations and a set of demographic questions. For each vignette, participants were asked to rate how they would behave in that situation. The experiment took approximately 20 min to complete.
Vignettes
Everyday intergroup conflicts (see Appendix: https://osf.io/mz7r6/#) included: (a) two hobby 3 Some participants took part in another experiment directly before the present one. However, it is difficult to predict the effect of the previous experiment on the results of this experiment.
sports teams competing over the right to use a particular athletic field; (b) several departments at the participant's university competing for air-conditioning units to be supplied by the university to survive the severe hot summer weather; (c) research groups in a class competing for the highest assignment grade; and (d) a convenience store in which the participant has a part-time job competing for sales with a rival convenience store. In all vignettes, the group to which participants belonged was in conflict with another group over resources; it was emphasized that defeat would incur costs for all ingroup members. In addition, an incentive for free-riding was also emphasized by indicating that a personally desirable event was occurring at the same time as the intergroup conflict (e.g., a promise to hang out with friends, or an extended deadline for a paper due in another class). Thus, participants faced a dilemma between group and personal interests. No instructions regarding the interactions within and between groups were given. To counterbalance the order of the four vignettes, two between-participants order conditions were created (Vignette 1 to 4, and Vignette 4 to 1).
Manipulation of intergroup conflict.
Intergroup conflict was manipulated by varying the cost of defeat for the ingroup. In the moderate-conflict condition, 5 participants were told to imagine that defeat would wipe out their own resources (e.g., they would never use the athletic field, or they would fail the course and would not graduate from the university). In the weak-conflict condition, participants were told that defeat would result in some minor cost (e.g., they would have to use another athletic field, or they would not receive an "A" but would still pass the course). Participants were randomly assigned to these conditions (N = 88 in the moderateconflict condition, N = 92 in the weak-conflict condition).
Questionnaire. Participants rated their intention to cooperate with the ingroup (henceforth "cooperation intention") using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = absolutely) after reading each vignette. They were asked to what extent they intended to cooperate with their own group even if they would have to cancel personal events. Participants were also asked to imagine each case in which 20% ("20% ingroup-cooperation"), 40% ("40% ingroup-cooperation"), 60% ("60% ingroup-cooperation"), or 80% ("80% ingroup-cooperation") of the other ingroup members cooperated. Based on this information, participants were asked to decide whether they would cooperate or defect in each case. These items measured whether participants decided on their cooperation based on each cooperation rate within their group.
Experimental design. The experiment was a two (level of intergroup conflict: moderate/weak) × two (vignette order) × four (vignette: sports team/department/research group/convenience store) design. Intergroup conflict and vignette order were betweenparticipants variables; vignette was a withinparticipants variable.
Prediction
Following our hypothesis that intergroup conflict would enhance both ingroup cooperation and conformity, two predictions were made. First, participants would show more cooperation across four scenarios in the moderate intergroup conflict condition than in the weak condition. Second, compared with the weak condition, the frequency of those who adopted a frequency-dependent tendency would exceed in the moderate condition.
5
It is difficult to identify the level of intergroup conflict in the real world. In a previous study, the costs of defeat of intergroup conflict were assumed to be crucially high, such as death (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1988) . Thus, the cost that was assumed in this experiment may not precisely correspond to the theoretical one, but the condition of the manipulation of the level of intergroup conflict was named as "weak" and "moderate."
Results

Ingroup Cooperation
Each vignette was analyzed separately because Cronbach's alpha among vignettes was .40. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for each intergroup conflict condition and each vignette.
6 A 2 × 2 × 4 analysis of variance on ingroup cooperation revealed significant main effects of intergroup conflict, F(1, 175) = 10.97, p < .01, η Simple main effects analyses of intergroup conflict for each vignette showed a significant difference for Vignette 2, t(164.96) = 4.02, p < .01, r = .30, and Vignette 3, t(164.67) = 2.82, p < .01, r = .22. On the other hand, there were no significant differences for Vignette 1, t(177) = 1.59, p = .056, r = .12, or Vignette 4, t(178) = 0.57, p = .29, r = .04 (all one-tailed tests). Overall, these results partially supported the first prediction that ingroup cooperation would increase as intergroup conflict became more serious.
Frequency-dependent Tendencies
To investigate the effect of intergroup conflict on frequency-dependent tendency, in this analysis, we categorized participants into five categories based on the patterns of each cooperation rate within a group. First, these patterns were named "positive-frequency- . Participants who cooperated in all cooperation rates (C, C, C, C) were categorized as "unconditional cooperators," while those who defected in all cooperation rates (D, D, D, D) were referred as "unconditional defectors." Participants who did not fit into one of these four categories were named "others." The reason why 40% and 60% (less or more than 50%) were included in positive-frequency-dependence and negative-frequency-dependence is that frequency-dependency is defined as the behavioral pattern according to which an individual decides on cooperation if the ingroup cooperation rate overcomes the threshold (how many members cooperated within a group) and this is inherited in the individual (Nakanishi & Yokota, 2016) . On the other hand, based on cultural group selection theory and the traditional definition in the field of social psychology, the threshold of conformity is referred to as 50%. Although our definition of conformity does not completely match the traditional one, it can categorize those who cooperate at a 40% cooperative rate as a positive-frequencydependence strategy because the strategy triggers off cooperation under the condition in which a certain number of ingroup members overcomes their own threshold. Thus, the individual differences of the threshold are assumed in our prediction. Following the definition, a 20% or 40% cooperation rate fulfills frequency-dependence compared with 0%. However, in this experiment, a 0% cooperation rate was not measured, so we categorized 40% but not 20% as frequency-dependence in this analysis (60% and 80% compared with 100% is vice versa). Table 2 shows frequencies, percentages, and the results of the binominal test on the differences between conditions by a condition in each vignette. Only Vignettes 1 and 2 showed that frequency-dependence in the moderate condition was more than that in the weak condition. Instead, in Vignette 3 and 4, negative-frequency-dependence was increased by the effect of intergroup conflict. Thus, our prediction was supported in part.
Discussion
The current study tested the hypothesis that intergroup conflict would enhance both ingroup cooperation and conformity. A vignette experiment in which participants imagined daily-life intergroup conflict situations demonstrated that ingroup cooperation and conformity to the majority increased as the intensity of intergroup conflict increased. The results of two out of four vignettes showed that as the intergroup conflict intensified, ingroup cooperation enhanced. These results are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Bornstein, 2003; Sherif, 1966) . The results of the frequency-dependent tendency showed that the effect of intergroup conflict was observed only in Vignettes 1 and 2. In Vignettes 3 and 4, however, participants conformed to the minority. Therefore, these results partially support our hypothesis.
Some limitations of the current experiment should be noted. First, the validity of scenarios in this study should be reexamined. In this study, we predicted the same pattern in cooperation intention and frequency-dependent tendency through four vignettes. However, the Second, a laboratory experiment is sufficient to confirm the validity of the hypothesis. This experiment could be revised in four ways: (a) changing the costs to participants; (b) improving measurement of behavior; (c) manipulating reference to other group members' behavior; and (d) using a randomized sample. In particular, the sample in this experiment may be biased because it consisted of undergraduate students in a psychology class. The students in these classes did not know the study hypothesis, but knowledge of conformity or intergroup conflict may have influenced the results. A laboratory experiment could be designed by the intergroup public-goods game (Bornstein & Horwitz, 1993) , and whether participants refer to other members in intergroup-conflict situations could be manipulated. Participants' reward could depend on their cooperation with their own group and the outcome of intergroup conflict. Conformity to the majority or minority could be measured in a condition in which participants can see other ingroup members' decisions (cooperation or defection). In another condition, it could be possible to manipulate whether the cooperation level in each trial could be referred. The agent-based simulation that supports our hypothesis (Nakanishi & Yokota, 2016; Yokota & Nakanishi, 2012 ) set up whether individuals can refer other group members' behavior of a prior trial in a social dilemma game. Thus, in a lab experiment, manipulation of whether participants can refer to other group members' game records is required. Furthermore, the information provided should also be manipulated (e.g., decision of only ingroup or both groups, result of intergroup conflict). Moreover, participants should be recruited from a participant pool that includes students from a range of departments to improve sample randomization.
Third, in this study, the psychological mechanisms underpinning conformity were not discussed. For instance, it is unclear which type of conformity-informative influence or normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955 )-drives the frequency-dependence tendency. In future, the mechanism underpinning frequency-dependence tendency under intergroup conflict situations should be investigated. Fourth, in this experiment, we did not measure cooperation intention at the 0% or 100% cooperation rate within a group. Frequency-dependent behavior is defined as changing one's behavior depending on the threshold of each individual (Nakanishi & Yokota, 2016) . Thus, a comparison between 0% and 100% and more than 0% and less than 100% should be shown.
The suggestion of our hypothesis is the evolution of conformity. For example, in the cultural group-selection model (Boyd & Richerson, 2005) , conformity is the key concept to explain how culture has evolved, but it does not explain how conformity can evolve. In the hypothesis, it is made clear what factors might enhance conformity. In addition, this hypothesis reveals another adaptive function of conformity besides uncertainty reduction in searching for accurate information (Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002 , 2003 . Further research on this hypothesis will contribute to our understanding of the development of cultural group-selection processes.
